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ABSTRACT 
Corrupt practices such as bribery and other abuses of public functions for private gain have 
been criminalised in almost all legal systems. Criminalisation of acts of corruption 
constitutes one of the major dimensions of the international anti-corruption instruments.  
The clandestine nature of corruption crimes creates difficulties in gathering evidence for 
prosecution and effective implementation of the law. To overcome such problems, some 
indicators of corruption such as possession of property that far exceeds legitimate sources 
of income need to be criminalised. It is also imperative to deal with the challenges 
associated with such criminalisation. This paper tries to analyse the challenges related to 
due process of law in the investigation and prosecution of illicit enrichment. Further, 
complexities associated with the process of recovering illicitly acquired assets, such as 
resources and expertise, as well as effective co-operation among various jurisdictions, need 
to be explored. Special consideration will be given to the criminalisation of illicit enrichment 
and its prosecution in the Ethiopian anti-corruption legal framework.  
Key Words: Corruption, criminalisation, illicit enrichment, prosecution, human rights, 
burden of proof, presumption of innocence, asset recovery, criminal forfeiture, civil 
forfeiture. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
ILLICIT ENRICHMENT AND CORRUPTION 
1 Introduction  
Corruption is becoming a major threat to the world. All countries of the globe are running 
the risks associated with it. The international community, in combating corruption, calls 
upon states to outlaw and criminalise certain acts of corruption, and illicit enrichment is one 
of them.1 Since not all states of the world have criminalised illicit enrichment under the 
ambit of their anti-corruption legislation,2  this study mainly addresses the importance of its 
criminalisation so as to fight corruption in a broader and more effective way. 
 By giving special emphasis to the Ethiopian legal framework on the matter, the nature of 
the offence, its prosecution, and the challenges associated with recovering the proceeds of 
the crime, especially such proceeds as have already gone from the country, will be 
considered. In this regard, the effectiveness of the law in contributing towards the effort to 
eradicate corruption is the central point.  
In addition to the law relating to the offence of illicit enrichment, the paper analyses the 
Ethiopian anti-corruption laws and their effectiveness in combating corruption.     
 
 
 
                                                          
1
  See, for example, Article 20 of UNCAC, Article 4(1)(g) of the AU Convention and Article IX(1) of the OAS  
    Convention.   
2
  For instance, the USA, Australia, Cambodia and Japan have not created the offence of illicit enrichment.  
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2 Research Questions 
Ethiopia is a party to most international and regional anti-corruption instruments. It has 
signed and ratified UNCAC3 and the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating 
Corruption.4 
 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index for 2011 ranked Ethiopia 120th 
on an index of 183 countries.5  Also, a report by Global Financial Integrity indicates Ethiopia 
lost US$ 11.7 billion to illicit financial outflows between 2000 and 2009.6  These are 
indications of where the country’s position on and commitment to combat corruption are 
located.  Therefore, the questions that will be raised and discussed are: 
- Whether the legal framework meant to prevent and combat corruption is in 
conformity with international instruments (with specific emphasis on illicit 
enrichment)? 
- Whether easing the burden of proof in illicit enrichment cases is the preferable way 
of conducting prosecutions? 
- What are the effects of such an approach to recovering the proceeds of the crime, in 
particular when the asset already has crossed the borders of the country?  
 
3 Scope of the Study 
The research paper mainly deals with the criminalisation of illicit enrichment under the 
Ethiopian anti-corruption legal framework. It also contemplates the implementation and 
effectiveness of the law in combating corruption. 
                                                          
3
  Ethiopia signed the Convention on 10 December 2003 and ratified it on 26 November 2007.    
4
  The Convention was signed by Ethiopia on 1 June 2004 and ratified on 18 September 2007. 
5
  Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (2011). 
6
  Task Force on Financial Integrity and Economic Development Report (2011). 
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4 Significance of the Study 
This paper examines the legal framework of illicit enrichment and identifies the weaknesses 
of the anti-corruption legislation in Ethiopia. In doing so, it contributes to laying a 
foundation for further studies in the area; and also helps to draw the attention of policy 
makers to the need to amend the legal framework, as an effective and strong legal 
framework is a crucial mechanism by which corruption may be prevented and cured. In 
addition, in tackling the issue of the burden of proof in prosecutions, the paper tries to raise 
issues relating to basic human rights law principles, such as the presumption of innocence, 
and the paper takes this opportunity to contribute ideas to the ongoing academic debate in 
this area.    
5   Literature Review 
Different scholars have written on the importance of illicit enrichment. Articles by 
Kamunde7 and Lewis8 set out the importance of the prosecution of illicit enrichment in 
fighting corruption. However, some scholars disagree. Wilsher, for example, argues that 
there is no need for an independent criminal act of illicit enrichment.9  In line with 
international and other regional instruments on the subject, this paper argues in favour of 
an independent crime of illicit enrichment as a mechanism for fighting the enduring threat 
of corruption. 
Within the scope of this paper, an article by Mezmur & Koen specifically criticises the 
institutional framework of the Ethiopian Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission.10  
This article does not deal with the limitations associated with the legal framework of illicit 
                                                          
7
  Kamunde (2010). 
8
  Lewis  (2012). 
9
  Wilsher (2006). 
10
  Mezmur & Koen (2011). 
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enrichment and its prosecution. Hence, the legal framework of the prosecution of this 
particular crime will be the focus of this paper.  
6 Research Methodology  
The methodology is qualitative, comparative and critical-analytical, and will be 
operationalised via desktop research. This paper will analyse the criminalisation of illicit 
enrichment within the scope of the anti-corruption instruments. Special emphasis will be 
given to the Ethiopian legal framework which deals with illicit enrichment. For comparative 
analysis, the legal framework of Singapore and Hong Kong will be considered. The reason for 
choosing these countries for a comparative analysis is that both countries have already 
criminalised illicit enrichment under their respective anti-corruption legal regimes.11  These 
countries are also among the most successful countries in preventing corruption.12 
7 Structure of the Study 
This chapter has introduced the research topic and has given an overview of the need to 
employ different mechanisms to fight corruption.  
 
The second chapter comprises three parts. The first part will discuss the factual situation of 
corruption and historical development of anti-corruption laws in Ethiopia.  
 
The second part deals with the compatibility of Ethiopian anti-corruption laws with 
international instruments. The third part will attempt a comparison of the Ethiopian anti-
corruption legal framework with those of Singapore and Hong Kong. 
 
                                                          
11
  ADB/OECD (2004: 26). 
12
 Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index for 2011 ranked Singapore and Hong Kong 5
th
 and  
    12
th 
respectively on an Index of 183 countries and territories. 
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The third chapter deals with the prosecution of illicit enrichment and examines the standard 
of evidence to prove the crime.  It also tries to look further into the challenges associated 
with executing judgements, especially with regard to recovering assets that already have 
crossed the borders of the country. Based on cases decided at different levels of the federal 
and regional courts of Ethiopia, the effectiveness of the law with regard to illicit enrichment 
in combating corruption will be analysed. The questions that are posed in this research 
paper will be addressed in this chapter.  
The fourth chapter concludes the study. It will contain recommendations on the way 
forward for the strengthening and effective application of the Ethiopian law of illicit 
enrichment.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
MECHANISMS TO FIGHT CORRUPTION 
In this chapter a brief explanation and analysis of the existing situation of corruption in 
Ethiopia will be discussed.  Special consideration will be given to the historical development 
of the anti-corruption laws, and to the mechanisms and strategies chosen by the state to 
fight corruption. The implementation of the laws and their effectiveness in reducing 
corruption will be discussed too. The chapter also analyses the compatibility of the anti-
corruption laws of Ethiopia with the international and regional anti-corruption instruments. 
A comparative analysis of the approach favoured by Ethiopia for fighting corruption with 
that of Hong Kong and Singapore will be attempted.  
2.1   The Factual Situation of Corruption in Ethiopia  
Corruption in Ethiopia is an old phenomenon but the acts of corruption had not been 
recognised as illegal and immoral by society.13 In the past, it was considered the right of 
public officials to receive gifts and undue advantages from the people whom they serve. 
Bribing officials was seen as legitimate. Hence the popular saying, ‘He who does not benefit 
while in power, will regret when he comes down’.14  It was usual for a person to obtain 
service in exchange for money or valuable property. A number of studies show that during 
the monarchical regimes, appointments used to be given only if the candidates were able to 
provide a specified amount of money. To be appointed as provincial administrator, district 
administrator, or regional administrator, the candidates were expected to provide 3 000,  
                                                          
13
  FEACC (2012: 20-21). 
14
  FEACC (2008: 18). 
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5 000 and 10 000 ETB respectively.15  
 In 2001, a nation-wide corruption survey was conducted by the Addis Ababa University 
Institute of Research and Education in collaboration with the FEACC.  According to the 
survey, fraud or forgery, embezzlement of public funds, bribery, extortion, nepotism, and 
theft were recognised as manifestations of corruption in the country.16  The study pointed 
out that the services provided by government offices, such as land distribution, housing 
allocation, judicial services and the tax collecting system, were not transparent and 
efficient.17 
The infamous gold scam scandal that occurred in March 2008 is a recent occurrence that 
indicates the situation of corruption. In this case, the Ethiopian Central Bank exported a 
consignment of gold bars to the government of South Africa and the gold turned out to be 
gilded steel.  The 2010 disappearance of 10 000 tons of coffee ready for export from a 
government warehouse can be mentioned also as an indication of the prevalence of 
corruption in Ethiopia.18  
It is also important to note here that Ethiopia has been scoring between 3.5 and 2.7 in 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index from 2001 to 2011.19  The data 
analysis for such outcome, among other factors, takes into consideration ‘the enforcement 
of anti-corruption laws, access to information and conflict of interest’.20 
                                                          
15
  FEACC (2008: 13) and FEACC (2012: 21).  
16
  Tesfaye (2007: 2). 
17
  Tesfaye (2007: 2). 
18
  European Union and the World Bank (2010: 30). 
19
  Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (2001-2011). According to TI’s Corruption   
     Perceptions Index, a country that has scored 9.5 is perceived as free of corruption,  whereas countries 
     that have scored 1.0 are perceived as highly corrupt. A country’s rank indicates its position relative to the  
     other countries or territories included in the index. 
20
  Transparency International (2011). 
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According to the 2011 Global Financial Integrity Report, Ethiopia lost US$11.7 billion in illicit 
financial outflows between 2000 and 2009.  Corruption is indicated to be the cause of the 
outflows.  The Report further states that the illegal outflows of money have been increasing 
and in 2009 the amount reached US$3.26 billion, which was double the amount in 2007 and 
2008. The Report concluded that this amount far exceeds the total exports of the country, 
which was $2 billion for the year 2009.21 
2.2    The Development of Anti-Corruption Laws in Ethiopia  
The 1957 Penal Code enacted by the Imperial regime criminalised breach of integrity or 
honesty by public servants and other corrupt practices as corruption offences.22  The 
offences that are characterised as corruption, though not comprehensive and rigorous in 
their punishment, were included under the Special Part, Title III of the 1957 Penal Code.23 
During the Derg military regime, ethical values in public administration, institutions and 
various governmental organisations drastically declined and corruption was widespread.24  
As a result, the government took the initiative to fight corruption by enacting additional 
laws, establishing special courts and creating teams to investigate and prosecute crimes of 
corruption.25 In addition to the existing Penal Code, the Special Penal Code was 
promulgated in 1982.26  The provisions of this Code were meant to be applicable exclusively 
to civil servants and military personnel.  However, none of these laws criminalised illicit 
enrichment and other related conduct as crimes of corruption.  The 1957 Penal Code was 
amended later by the Criminal Code of 2005.  The new Criminal Code encompasses detailed 
                                                          
21
  Global Financial Integrity Report (2011). 
22
  Proclamation No 158/1957. 
23
  See Articles 410-416 of the Penal Code of 1957. 
24
  Shimelis (2005: 67). 
25
  FEACC (2008: 14). 
26
  Proclamation No 214/1981. 
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acts of corruption.27  Abuse of power, owning unexplained property or illicit enrichment, 
obtaining undue advantages, undue delay of matters, misappropriation in discharge of 
duties and other corrupt practices have been included in the Criminal Code.28 
In addition, for the purpose of preventing corruption and other improprieties, a law that 
requires the disclosure and registration of asset was enacted and entered into force in 2010. 
The law is applicable to appointees, elected persons and public servants of the Federal 
Government, and of the Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa City Administrations.29 
2.3   The Establishment of the Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (FEACC) 
After the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) assumed power in 
1991, the severe corrupt practices within the civil service institutions compelled the new 
government to begin a Civil Service Reform Programme in 1994.30  A task force comprised of 
senior government officials and civil servants was established to conduct a survey of the 
performance of the civil service.31 The task force produced a report that recommended the 
establishment of a dedicated body to fight corruption.32  Based on the survey and a needs 
assessment conducted by the task force, in 2001 Parliament endorsed the FEACC 
Establishment Proclamation No 235/2001 along with Anti-Corruption Special Procedure and 
Rules of Evidence Proclamation No 236/2001.  After these proclamations entered into force, 
the 1957 Penal Code was amended by the Criminal Code of 2005.  Henceforth, it became 
necessary to redefine the powers and duties of the FEACC in line with the new Criminal 
Code. Therefore, the FEACC Establishment Proclamation No 235/2001 and the Anti-
                                                          
27
  See Title III, Chapter II of the Criminal Code of 2005. 
28
  See Articles 407-426 of the Criminal Code of 2005. 
29
  Proclamation No 668/2010. 
30
  FEACC (2008: 16).  
31
  European Union and the World Bank (2010: 7).  
32
  European Union and the World Bank (2010: 8).  
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Corruption Special Procedure and Rules of Evidence Proclamation No 236/2001 were later 
amended by the Revised FEACC Establishment Proclamation No 433/2005 and the Revised 
Anti-Corruption Special Procedure and Rules of Evidence Proclamation No 434/2005 
respectively.   
The establishment of FEACC, contrary to the opinion of some commentators33 and 
international organisations,34  was not for the purpose of hampering the activities of former 
political leaders and prominent business allies who posed a challenge or threat to the 
regime. Rather, as revealed by the task force survey, corrupt practices were extremely 
common in the public sector at the time the survey was conducted.  Therefore, the driving 
force underlining the establishment of the Commission was as genuine as it was apparent.  
The FEACC Establishment Proclamation gives the Commission a full mandate for preventing, 
investigating and prosecuting acts of corruption and other improprieties provided for in the 
Criminal Code.35 
In its 2011 annual performance report, the FEACC reported that it had investigated corrupt 
practices in land administration and other government offices and managed to bring 
perpetrators to court. The Commission, on the basis of a court verdict, succeeded in 
transferring 8.7 million ETB, 192 152 km2   of corruptly acquired land, four automobiles and 
the administration of one steel factory to the government.  According to the report, the 
Commission’s conviction rate has reached 86.8 per cent.36  However, according to a 
Transparency International report, the Commission’s effort in fighting grand corruption is 
                                                          
33
  Alemayehu (2008). 
34
  Freedom House Report (2007: 19). 
35
  See Paragraph four of the Preamble and Article 6 of Proclamation No 231/2001, as amended by  
     Proclamation No 434/2005. 
36
  FEACC Annual Performance Report (2011: 12).  
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minimal37 and there is also a concern with regard to its independence in prosecuting high 
profile cases.38   Recently, however, the Commission has been investigating and putting on 
trial high ranking public officials.39 For example, Mr Yaregal Aysheshim, the ex-President of 
Benishangul Gumz Regional State, and Mr Habtamu Hika, Speaker of the House for the 
region’s Parliament, are currently under investigation by the Commission.   
In its effort to combat corruption, the FEACC has identified areas where corruption is 
prevalent. Public procurement offices (grand procurement), land distribution and 
administration bodies, custom administration and tax collecting authorities are indicated to 
be the major areas where corruption is rampant. Accordingly, these are the focus areas of 
the strategic plan of FEACC for the years 2010-2015.40 
Despite the existence of anti-corruption laws and some improvements in its detection, 
investigation and prosecution, corruption remains a major challenge in Ethiopia. 
 2.4   The Compatibility of Domestic Anti-Corruption Laws with International Anti-    
          Corruption Instruments 
Ethiopia signed the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) in December 
2003 and ratified it in November 2007. It also signed the African Union Convention on 
Preventing and Combating Corruption (AU Convention) in June 2004 and ratified it in 
September 2007. In addition, it signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organised Crime (UNCTOC) in December 2000 and ratified it in July 2007. These 
international instruments are essential for providing a global legal framework for combating 
corruption. They play an important role in setting basic standards and guidelines for 
                                                          
37
  Transparency International (2010: 176). 
38
  Business Anti-Corruption Portal: ‘Snapshot of the Ethiopian Country Profile’. 
39
  Tamiru ‘Commission Apprehends Yaregal Aysheshim, Court Denies Bail’ The Reporter 22 October 2011. 
40
  Interview with FEACC Commissioner Ali Suleiman: Ethics Magazine Special Edition (July 2011: 20).  
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national legislation.41  Therefore, though most provisions of the international instruments 
are not mandatory and contain safeguard clauses, 42 it is important to deal with the 
compatibility of domestic anti-corruption laws with international anti-corruption 
conventions.      
2.4.1   The Criminal Code 
The 1957 Penal Code of the Empire of Ethiopia, although containing in its Part III of Chapter I 
offences against public office, offences against official duties and other corrupt practices, 
failed to address properly other corruption-related criminal conduct born of advances in 
technology and the complexities of modern life. In its contribution to the anti-corruption 
campaign, the Penal Code failed to criminalise acts such as illicit enrichment and money 
laundering.43   
With the amendment of the Penal Code in 2005, illicit enrichment has been criminalised and 
included within the legislative framework of the new Criminal Code.44  Further, money 
laundering has been criminalised in the Criminal Code.45 
UNCAC and the AU Convention encourage states parties to criminalise illicit enrichment.46  
In the discussions preceding the adoption of UNCAC, though delegations expressed their 
desire for the inclusion of illicit enrichment, some were concerned about its direct 
criminalisation because the concept may include a reversal of the burden of proof. The 
                                                          
41
  Transparency International: ‘Anti-Corruption Conventions and Instruments Explained’.  
42
  Babu (2006: 9).  
43
  See paragraph two of the Preamble to the Criminal Code of 2005. 
44
  See Article 419 of the Criminal Code of 2005. 
45
  See Article 684 of the Criminal Code of 2005.  
46
  See Article 20 of UNCAC and Article 8(1) of the AU Convention.  
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Russian Federation and member states of European Union were opposed to and expressed 
their wish to delete the article. 47 
The reasons for having an independent criminal act of illicit enrichment in the international 
as well as national anti-corruption legal frameworks and debates on the criminalisation of 
illicit enrichment and related issues will be discussed further in chapter three.   
2.4.2   Anti-Money Laundering Law 
Money laundering, as defined by Chaikin & Sharman, is ‘the process of concealing the illicit 
origin of money derived from crime’.48  Money acquired through the commission of 
corruption can be used easily for investments and other economic activities and thus ill-
gotten money appears legitimate. Within this context, money laundering facilitates 
corruption and vice versa.49  Therefore, a comprehensive and integrated response must be 
available in order to combat both crimes.50 
The AU Convention, UNCAC and UNCTOC require states to adopt legislative and other 
measures that criminalise and prevent laundering of proceeds of crime and concealment or 
continued retention of property acquired by corruption.51  The provisions of UNCAC and 
UNCTOC similarly provide that, to deter and detect all forms of money laundering, states are 
required to have a comprehensive domestic regulatory and supervisory system for banks,  
non-bank financial institutions and other bodies susceptible to money laundering.52 
                                                          
47
  UNODC (2010: 198).     
48
  Chaikin & Sharman (2009: 14). 
49
   See paragraph two of the Preamble to UNCAC.  
50
  Chaikin & Sharman (2009:23). 
51
  See Articles 23 and 24 of UNCAC, Article 6 of the AU Convention and Article 6 of UNCTOC. 
52
  See Article 14 of UNCAC and Article 7 of UNCTOC. 
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In response to these provisions of the conventions, and in addition to amending the Penal 
Code of 1957, 53 a law that is designed to prevent and suppress money laundering and the 
financing of terrorism was passed by the Ethiopian Parliament in late 2009.54  The law 
compels banks, financial institutions and others referred to as accountable persons to 
disclose evidence and information they have acquired from their customers.55   Pursuant to 
this law, obligations of confidentiality, including professional secrecy imposed by other laws, 
may not be a bar to report or give evidence or information.56 
2.4.3   The Law Relating to Asset Disclosure and Registration  
Asset declaration by public officials and government employees is considered as one of the 
preventive mechanisms needed to control corruption.57  This preventive mechanism has 
been recognised by both UNCAC and the AU Convention.58  According to these instruments, 
states parties are required to commit themselves to adopting legislation and other 
measures that require officials to declare their external activities, employment, 
investments, gifts or benefits from which a conflict of interest may arise. Such declarations 
must be made at the time of assumption of office, during and after the term of their public 
service.59 
In 2010, in response to its obligations under these anti-corruption instruments, the 
government of Ethiopia passed the Disclosure and Registration of Assets Proclamation.60 
The purpose of this law is to facilitate preventive mechanisms in the fight against 
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corruption. In its preamble, the Proclamation says that ‘the disclosure of assets is of 
paramount importance in the prevention of corruption and improprieties and helps to 
enhance good governance’.61  The applicability of the Proclamation is confined to political 
appointees, elected persons and public servants.62 These persons are compelled to register 
assets that are under their and their family’s ownership or possession; and the sources of 
the income of themselves and their family.63 The Proclamation defines ‘family’ to include 
‘spouse, dependent child under the age of 18, adopted children and spouse in irregular 
union’.64  
In addition to its preventive purpose, the asset disclosure and registration law is important 
for the detection of corruptly accumulated wealth and the prosecution of corrupt public 
officials and civil servants for the crime of illicit enrichment.65  Any asset of an appointee, an 
elected person or a public servant not registered in accordance with the Proclamation, in 
the absence of proof to the contrary, is considered unexplained property.66 
The effectiveness of the asset disclosure and registration law in the prevention of corruption 
has attracted criticism.  First, in disclosing and registering assets, the information that will be 
provided by concerned officials in most circumstances may not be real and accurate. The 
body in charge of registration, that is, the FEACC, mainly relies upon the information 
provided by the person registering the asset. The Commission has been granted the 
mandate to verify the information submitted where there is sufficient ground to suspect 
that the information is false, incomplete and inaccurate.  Even though the mechanism for 
                                                          
61
  Paragraph two of the Preamble to Proclamation No 668/2010.  
62
  See Article 3 of Proclamation No 668/2010.  
63
  See Article 4 of Proclamation No 668/2010. 
64
  See Article 2(8) of Proclamation No 668/2010. 
65
  Mezmur & Koen (2011: 227). See also Article 13 of Proclamation No 668/2010. 
66
  See Article 13 of Proclamation No 668/2010.  
 
 
 
 
17 
 
verification is provided under the Proclamation, this by itself does not guarantee the 
submission of accurate information. Second, it has been said that such law usually fails to 
control the possible transfer of properties to a third party67 as it only imposes an obligation 
to declare personal income and assets and those of the immediate family members. It is 
important to mention here that in a society like Ethiopia, the relationship among members 
of extended families is very tight. In such instances, the probability of the transfer of assets 
to members of the extended family is likely to be high. Third, according to some scholars, 
while prescribing disclosure and registration of assets, the law fails to require officials to 
prove that the assets under consideration were not gained illegally.68  These scholars further 
add that this lacuna in the law gives public officials the opportunity for validating corruptly 
obtained properties.69 
2.4.4   Anti-Corruption Laws of Ethiopia and the Private Sector 
Since 1991 there has been a political transition in Ethiopia.  In the process of the transition 
to democracy, the bureaucratic procedures of the Derg military regime have been simplified 
and measures have been taken towards economic liberalisation.70 Following this economic 
liberalisation, privately owned banks, textile industries, construction companies and other 
small and large industries have been growing. Accordingly, Ethiopia’s economy has been 
expanding during the last six years.71  The economic growth and free flow of money 
enhances the interaction within the private sector and between the private sector and 
public institutions and this situation creates opportunities for corruption.72 Hence, 
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preventing corruption in the private sector assists in building a commercial environment 
that is characterised by efficient and fair competition.73     
Moreover, there is a consensus among scholars that though economic liberalisation has its 
own advantages for development, it does not guarantee the reduction of corruption. In fact, 
bribes previously demanded by public officials and public servants now will be requested by 
the staff of private firms.74   
Against this background, UNCAC and the AU Convention encourage states parties to take 
legislative and other measures that can prevent and criminalise acts of corruption and 
related offences committed within the private sector.75   
However, unless a crime involves a public official and matters such as public-private 
collusion, corruption in the private sector is not covered by the Ethiopian anti-corruption 
legal framework.76  The amended FEACC Establishment Proclamation No 433/2005 
mandated the Commission only to have jurisdiction over public offices and public 
enterprises.77  Also, the Criminal Code does not regulate corruption-related offences 
committed within the private sector.78  Therefore, the anti-corruption law in this respect 
lags behind the international anti-corruption instruments.   
2.4.5    Anti-Corruption Laws and Civil Asset Forfeiture 
In the fight against corruption, civil asset forfeiture plays a crucial role. The importance of 
asset forfeiture is based on its deterrent effect.79   Further, civil forfeiture serves as a 
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mechanism by which stolen public property could be recovered and returned to the public. 
It is also important to note that asset recovery constitutes one of the centrepieces of 
international anti-corruption conventions, especially UNCAC.80  UNCAC and the AU 
Convention require states parties to have a domestic legal structure for the confiscation of 
the proceeds of corruption.81 
Corruptly acquired property can be forfeited either through criminal conviction or civil 
proceedings.82   As the ultimate goal of corrupt public officials is the accumulation of wealth, 
the deterrent effect of a criminal conviction should not be limited to deprivation of liberty. 
Indeed, in most criminal jurisdictions, including Ethiopia, experience shows that following 
criminal conviction, properties acquired through corrupt practice are transferred to the 
government.83  In criminal law, forfeiture of proceeds of the crime upon which the accused 
is convicted constitutes part of the punishment.84  Criminal asset forfeiture is based on the 
principle that the liability follows the suspect himself – in personam – and, hence, it is only 
his conviction that allows a claim over the property obtained by the criminal conduct of 
which he is found guilty.85 This theory is based on the classic criminal law principle of 
individualisation of guilty.  
In the case of civil action, the proceeding is not against a particular person but against the 
property that the alleged offender obtained corruptly - an in rem action.86  According to this 
principle, such action can be instituted even in the absence of the defendant.87  In civil 
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litigation, the procedure differs from that of criminal litigation, and the evidential 
requirement to prove the facts in issue is proof on ‘a balance of probability’.88 
The Ethiopian Criminal Code contains provisions for criminal forfeiture. Property acquired 
directly or indirectly through the commission of a crime for which the criminal was 
convicted will be confiscated.89  In addition, both the Revised FEACC Establishment 
Proclamation No 433/2005 and the Revised   Special Procedure and Rules of Evidence 
Proclamation No 434/2005 provide for forfeiture upon criminal conviction of assets and 
wealth obtained corruptly.90  If the defendant is acquitted, the confiscation of property will 
not occur. The option of civil forfeiture is not provided under any of these laws.91  In the 
absence of criminal prosecution and conviction, having a mechanism by which looted 
properties can be returned to the public is of paramount importance. Therefore, it is 
important to have a domestic legal framework on civil forfeiture for it ensures the due 
process of law in adjudicating property rights.92 
It is fair to mention here that though criminal forfeiture is provided for both under the 
general criminal law and anti-corruption laws, these laws have not been implemented fully.  
The FEACC has not made the best use of these laws yet. It is only in recent times that asset 
confiscation is being carried out following a criminal conviction.93 
2.4.6   Anti-Corruption Legal Framework and International Co-operation 
Corruption may not be confined to a single state or territory. In certain circumstances, its 
commission starts in one sovereign state and ends in another, thus affecting the interests of 
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two or more states. With technological advances, the commission of the crime is even more 
complicated and imposes difficulties in tracing the evidence. The proceeds of the crime 
leave a country of origin as fast as the speed of light. Criminals hide their corruptly obtained 
money in offshore banks where the rules of secrecy are strict.94   Moreover, suspects flee 
the jurisdiction of the state where the crime was committed in search of a safe haven.  The 
organised nature of the crime of corruption that transcends a single state is therefore 
becoming a pressing reason for the international community to co-operate in the fight 
against corruption.95 
International co-operation is one of the four pillars upon which UNCAC is founded.96  In 
addition, one of the objectives of the AU Convention is to promote, facilitate and regulate 
co-operation among states parties to combat corruption and corruption-related offences in 
Africa.97  Further, it has been reaffirmed that promotion of co-operation among states is the 
main purpose of UNCTOC in combating transnational organised crime, including 
corruption.98 
International co-operation is strengthened further by bilateral and multilateral treaties 
which include extradition treaties, mutual legal assistance, freezing and confiscation of 
proceeds of crimes and transfer of proceedings.99  With regard to international co-
operation, Ethiopia mainly relies on international conventions it has ratified.100  Recently it 
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ratified one of the regional multilateral conventions on mutual legal assistance on criminal 
matters.101 
It is important to mention that effective implementation of international co-operation 
depends on national substantive or procedural laws.102  However, to enforce international 
multilateral as well as regional agreements on co-operation, the existing domestic law in 
Ethiopia is inadequate.  The Criminal Code of 2005, for instance, deals only with extradition 
matters and fails to provide for other matters that concern international co-operation.103 
2.5    Comparative Analysis  
This section of the paper is devoted to a comparative analysis of the anti-corruption 
legislative framework of Hong Kong and Singapore in relation to Ethiopian anti-corruption 
legislation. As pointed out in the preceding chapter, these countries have been selected 
because of their successes in controlling corruption.  
Ethiopia adopted its preventive, detection, and investigative approach to combating 
corruption mainly from the experience of the Hong Kong anti-corruption agency.104 
Therefore, it is reasonable to compare the Ethiopian legislative framework with the 
legislative framework of these countries and learn important lessons from their 
accomplishments in the fight against corruption. 
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2.5.1   Hong Kong: ‘Corruption-Free Place in the World’105  
During 1960s and 1970s, corruption was a major problem in Hong Kong.106  In response to 
the threat which corruption posed to all government departments, the Independent 
Commission against Corruption (ICAC) was established pursuant to the Independent 
Commission against Corruption and Matters Incidental Thereto Ordinance 7 of 1974.107  This 
body is independent of any executive branch of the government and reports to the Chief 
Executive.108 The privilege of being independent gives the ICAC a strong arm in exercising its 
mandate free from any political intervention.109  The ICAC adopted a tripartite approach to 
fighting corruption: prevention, prosecution and education. Its objectives are explained by 
its former Director of Administration, Mr Andrew HY Wong: 
‘to enforce anti-corruption laws effectively, detect and eradicate opportunities for 
corruption in government institutions, promote corruption prevention in private 
sectors and educate the community about the evils of corruption and enlist their 
support in the battle against corruption.’110 
It has been reported also that the ICAC has achieved much in eradicating corruption in 
public and government bodies.  It is the first anti-corruption agency in the world to 
implement successfully laws against private sector corruption, and to succeed in creating 
public awareness and promoting international co-operation.111 
Hong Kong has comprehensive anti-corruption laws. In addition to bribery, illicit enrichment 
and accepting gifts, loans and discounts unless specifically authorised are criminalised.112  
Unlike many countries which are suffering from the ravages of corruption, Hong Kong 
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regulates private sector corruption equally with public sector corruption. It is indicated also 
that the ICAC investigates any offence that has connections with corruption.113  The ICAC, 
with its dedication and independence, adequate professionals, resources and political 
backing is considered to be the most effective law enforcing institution in the fight against 
corruption.114 
Generally, with its comprehensive legislative regime and independent and strong anti-
corruption institution, Hong Kong demonstrated the possibility of controlling corruption. 
Currently, Hong Kong is recognised as one of the cleanest places in the world.115 Countries 
that are striving to win the battle against corruption can learn a lot from the Hong Kong 
experience. Some countries, including Ethiopia, have taken the experience of the ICAC and 
adopted a three-pronged approach to fighting corruption.  
Though there is no single approach to fighting corruption, it is most important to have an 
effective legal framework. Hong Kong has such a comprehensive legislative framework. The 
Hong Kong experience shows that for a successful anti-corruption campaign, an effective 
institutional framework and a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy are indispensable.  
 The analysis in this section shows that the Hong Kong legislative framework is far-reaching 
in its applicability. It covers corruption in the private sector and the acceptance of benefits 
by civil servants even if not associated with corruption.  
Under the Hong Kong Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, the offence of illicit enrichment, 
which is central to this paper, receives severe punishment which has a deterrent effect. The 
punishment for this offence may vary from a fine of $500 000 to $1 000 000 and 
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imprisonment of 7 to 10 years, depending upon the circumstances.116   These are the areas 
where the Ethiopian legislative framework has fallen short. The offence of possession of 
unexplained property under the Ethiopian Criminal Code carries only a maximum of five 
years’ imprisonment and a fine.117  It is important to emphasise that this has little deterrent 
effect for public officials who wish to abuse their power to accumulate millions either in 
domestic or in foreign banks.  This is evident in the cases of Prosecutor v Elizabeth Welde 
Gebriel et al118  and Hankara Harka Hamoya v Prosecutor119  where the Federal High Court 
has imposed three years’ imprisonment and 7000 ETB fine against the defendant in the first 
case and the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Bench has confirmed four years’ 
imprisonment given by subordinate courts against the defendant in the second case. 
2.5.2   The Singapore Anti-Corruption Laws 
Before 1960, corruption was a way of life in Singapore. An effective anti-corruption 
campaign began after the People’s Action Party (PAP) assumed power in 1959.120  The 
Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) is the agency that was established to curb 
corruption. It was founded in 1952 pursuant to the Prevention of Corruption Ordinance 
(PCO).121   The CPIB is devoted entirely to the investigation of corrupt acts and preparation 
of evidence for prosecution.122  The CPIB’s main powers and functions are ‘to receive and 
investigate complaints regarding corruption in the public and private sectors, to investigate 
malpractices and misconducts by public officers and to examine the practices and the 
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procedures in the public service to minimise opportunities for corrupt practices.’123   The 
PAP government reorganised the CPIB and it also amended the Prevention of Corruption 
Ordinance (PCO) several times.124  The law was later renamed the Prevention of Corruption 
Act (Chapter 241).125  
 
The Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes Act of 1999 confers broad 
powers on the CPIB and also prescribes severe punishment for corruption. The Singapore 
anti-corruption law is known for its deterrent effect. A conviction for corruption may carry a 
$100 000 fine and five years’ imprisonment.126  A person convicted of corruption has to pay 
the amount he has received as a bribe in addition to any other punishment imposed by the 
court.127   Corruption in both the public and private sectors is punishable.128  Other corrupt 
practices including illicit enrichment and receiving loans, discounts and other forms of 
benefits are criminalised.129 
Moreover, unlike the Hong Kong and the Ethiopian anti-corruption legal regime, the 
Singapore anti-corruption law includes civil forfeiture in the absence of a criminal 
conviction. The Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of 
Benefits Act of 1999) was enacted in order to provide for confiscation of proceeds of such 
crimes. This Act enables courts to order confiscation of proceeds of criminal conduct where 
the accused fails to stand trial because he has died, cannot be found, cannot be 
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apprehended or cannot be extradited.130  Any questions of fact that have to be decided by a 
court in such proceedings are decided on the balance of probability.131 
Further, the strict and consistent enforcement of anti-corruption laws by CPIB helped the 
anti-corruption campaign become fruitful in Singapore.132   In addition to the existence of a 
strong and comprehensive legislative framework and strict application of the laws, an 
effective anti-corruption agency, effective judiciary and political commitment play a leading 
role in combating corruption in Singapore.133  Today, Singapore is one of the states that 
have controlled corruption successfully.134 
Notwithstanding the uniqueness of its cultural, socio-economic and political context, 
Ethiopia can learn a lot from the anti-corruption campaign experience of Singapore.  To 
combat corruption effectively, anti-corruption measures and strategies such as 
comprehensive anti-corruption legislation and a strong and independent anti-corruption 
agency play an important role. The anti-corruption legal framework must be comprehensive 
so as to prevent loopholes and must be revised periodically in order to introduce 
amendments whenever necessary.135 
 2.6   Summary of Chapter Two 
This chapter has given a general overview of corruption and the historical development of 
anti-corruption legislation in Ethiopia. Motivated by the widespread prevalence of 
corruption in the country, the government took the initiative by establishing an anti-
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corruption body and enacting relevant laws. Various acts of corruption are criminalised 
within the existing anti-corruption laws and relevant international and regional anti-
corruption conventions have been ratified.  
Comparative analyses of the Hong Kong and Singapore legislative frameworks reveal the 
weakness and lacunae that exist in Ethiopian anti-corruption laws. Despite their 
categorisation as ‘strong and comprehensive’,136 the analysis made in relation to the 
international anti-corruption instruments reveals that the anti-corruption laws of Ethiopia 
do not regulate corruption in the private sector.  Civil asset forfeiture in the absence of a 
criminal conviction is also another area which the anti-corruption legislative framework fails 
to cover. Further, the analysis of the law shows that to enforce multilateral international or 
regional agreements on matters of international co-operation, the domestic law, especially 
the Criminal Code, is weak and does not cover all aspects of international co-operation.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
PROSECUTING ILLICIT ENRICHMENT 
This chapter deals with the criminalisation and prosecution of illicit enrichment. The 
justifications for the need to have an independent offence of illicit enrichment are provided. 
The lower standard of proof and its implication for basic principles of human rights will be 
analysed. Advantages and drawbacks of having an independent offence of illicit enrichment 
with regard to recovering assets situated in foreign jurisdictions and related issues will be 
examined.  In this discourse, special emphasis will be given to the Ethiopian law of illicit 
enrichment.   
3.1    Justifications for Criminalising Illicit Enrichment  
The crime of corruption by its nature is committed in secret, which creates difficulties for its 
detection and investigation.  However, property in the hands of public officials and their 
families that are manifestly in excess of their legitimate income would be relatively easy to 
detect, investigate and prosecute.137  The extreme difficulties in obtaining evidence to prove 
bribery and other related acts of corruption demand a consideration of the criminalisation 
of a significant increase in the property of public officials. The inclusion of the offence of 
illicit enrichment in the list of crimes of corruption is perceived to be an effective way of 
combating corruption.138 
The offence of illicit enrichment has been criminalised in various international and regional 
anti-corruption instruments.139  These instruments give the definition of illicit enrichment.  
UNCAC defines it to mean ‘a significant increase of the assets of a public official that he or 
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she cannot reasonably explain in relation to his or her lawful income’.140   While the scope of 
UNCAC seems restricted to the wealth of the public official, the AU Convention transcends 
such limitation by including the term ‘any other person’.141  This term was incorporated 
because assets can be transferred easily to third parties who are affiliated with public 
officials in one way or another.    
3.2    The Advantages and Disadvantages of Criminalising Illicit Enrichment 
The advantages of criminalising illicit enrichment are associated with the standard of proof 
required for conviction.  In prosecuting illicit enrichment as a crime of corruption, the 
prosecutor should prove beyond a reasonable doubt the disproportionate assets in the 
hands of the accused in relation to his legitimate income.  In this respect, the prosecutor is 
not required to prove the fact that the accused has received a bribe or committed any other 
form of corruption.142  Wealth that is not proportionate to the legitimate income of a public 
official is presumed to have originated from corruption unless the contrary is proved.  In 
such circumstance, the burden of proof is eased and the prosecutor is not required to prove 
corruption as a source of the wealth in question.  
 
However, because of the human rights debates raised by illicit enrichment, many countries 
are hesitant to criminalise it as an independent corruption crime. The impact of this 
response upon the anti-corruption effort will be discussed below.         
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3.2.1    Advantages of Criminalising Illicit Enrichment  
The advantages of establishing an independent crime of illicit enrichment will be discussed 
in the following sub-sections. Criminalising illicit enrichment mainly solves the problems 
associated with gathering evidence for the prosecution of corruption offences. Further, the 
investigation and prosecution of corruption offences require resources and skilled 
personnel. Hence, criminalising illicit enrichment is important, especially for 
underdeveloped countries which often lack such resources and personnel.      
3.2.1.1    Overcoming Hurdles Associated with Collecting Evidence 
The greatest obstacle for investigating and prosecuting the crime of corruption is linked to 
the gathering of evidence. One of the unique features of the crime of corruption is that it is 
‘a secret offence’.143  Most of the time, the persons who can be major witnesses are 
involved in the commission of the crime.144   Hence, it remains confidential among the 
parties who are involved in the crime and there would be no single individual victim to 
disclose and report it to the appropriate authorities.145 
 
Further, corrupt public officials in power have the ability to intimidate potential witnesses 
not to testify against them or to distort documentary evidence. Additionally, witnesses may 
die or leave.146  These situations problematise the detection, investigation and prosecution 
of corruption cases and make it hard to obtain direct evidence to prove corruption offences.        
 
Accordingly, the importance of criminalising illicit enrichment and easing the burden of 
proof to prosecute the offence has been growing considerably.147  In this regard, the offence 
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of illicit enrichment is considered to be an effective tool for combating corruption. However, 
despite its usefulness for the anti-corruption campaign, none of the international or regional 
anti-corruption instruments imposes an obligation on states to criminalise it.148 
 
Further, states have different options with regard to the standard of proof required in illicit 
enrichment cases.149   Either they can require the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt only the property that is manifestly disproportionate to the legitimate income or both 
the disproportionate property and the unlawful source of the property.150  However, 
requiring the prosecutor only to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the luxurious and 
disproportionate property as compared to the accused’s official income eases the burden of 
proof and assists in overcoming the challenges associated with obtaining evidence. It also 
facilitates the successful prosecution of corrupt public officials. 
 
3.2.1.2   Promotion and Protection of Human Rights 
There is a direct link between fighting corruption and the protection and promotion of 
human rights. According to the UN Human Rights Council, ‘the fight against corruption at all 
levels plays an important role in the promotion and protection of human rights and in the 
process of creating an environment conducive to their full enjoyment’.151  
It has been established that where corruption is rampant in a society, there usually is a high 
level of human rights violations.152  Corrupt public officials discriminate among citizens on 
the basis of economic status, social and family backgrounds or any other grounds. Nepotism 
and other corrupt practices erode the principles of equality and non-discrimination based 
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on social origin, colour, language, religious or political opinion, sex, property or other status 
as enshrined in international human rights instruments153 and domestic constitutions.154 
Further, public officials divert public resources allocated for economic and social 
development for their private gain, thereby retarding the overall development that has 
been recognised as a right by international human rights regimes155 and domestic 
constitutions.156 It is agreed generally that combating corruption through effective anti-
corruption tools, such as criminalising and prosecuting illicit enrichment, has positive 
implications for the protection and promotion of human rights.157   Combating corruption 
through the criminalisation of illicit enrichment also assists states in breaking the cycles of 
impunity. 
Moreover, states parties to international human rights instruments and anti-corruption 
conventions have obligations to implement the provisions of the instruments. In this 
respect, criminalising and prosecuting illicit enrichment allows states to fulfil the obligations 
they have undertaken under international human rights and anti-corruption regimes.  
It is important to note that the criminalisation of illicit enrichment can have a prominent 
impact on the anti-corruption campaigns of developing and transitioning states. Anti-
corruption agencies in developing countries suffer from inadequate resources both in terms 
of skilled human resources and financial and material resources.  These countries do not 
have the required capacity to detect and prosecute complex crimes of corruption.   
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  See, for example, Article 2(1) of the ICCPR, Article 2 of UDHR, Article 2 of the African Charter on Human and  
       Peoples’ Rights. 
154
  See, for example, Article 25 of the FDRE Constitution. 
155
  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. See also Article 22 of the African Charter   
       on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
156
  See, for example, Article 43 of the FDRE Constitution. 
157
  Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative, the World Bank and UNODC (2011: 7). See also Transparency International  
       (2008: 2). 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
Inadequate capacity could render the anti-corruption efforts of developing countries 
ineffective.  This scenario also affects adversely the obligation of states to ‘respect, promote 
and fulfil human rights values’.158  It is in this context that the offence of illicit enrichment 
can be used as an effective anti-corruption tool in underdeveloped countries and thereby 
promote and protect their citizens’ fundamental human rights.                        
3.2.1.3    Building Public Confidence in the Government   
Corruption undermines the effectiveness and efficiency of public institutions and erodes 
public trust in government.159  In particular, corruption affects the ability of governments to 
realise their objectives of social and economic development for vulnerable and marginalised 
groups of the society.160   Therefore, in order to reduce the risk that corruption poses to 
society, it is important to take measures such as criminalising and prosecuting illicit 
enrichment as it is one of the simplest tools for holding corrupt public officials 
accountable.161 
3.2.2    Challenges of Criminalising and Prosecuting Illicit Enrichment 
The challenges associated with the criminalisation of illicit enrichment will be discussed in 
the following sub-sections. Particularly, the weights given to illicit enrichment by 
international and regional anti-corruption instruments will be explored.  Additional 
challenges in the area of asset recovery will be considered also. 
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3.2.2.1   The Status of Illicit Enrichment in International and Regional Anti-Corruption   
                Instruments  
The international and regional anti-corruption instruments do not bind states parties to take 
legislative and other measures to criminalise illicit enrichment. Criminalisation is not 
mandatory either under UNCAC or the AU Convention. These instruments require the 
criminalisation of illicit enrichment to be compatible with the constitution and fundamental 
principles of the domestic law of states parties.162  These conventions and other regional 
anti-corruption instruments have made optional the criminalisation of illicit enrichment. 
They particularly employ a ‘safeguarding clause’163  that exempts states parties from the 
obligation of criminalising illicit enrichment if it conflicts with their constitutions and 
fundamental principles of their legal system.164  Thus, the criminalisation of the offence of 
illicit enrichment is possible only to the extent that the legal principles of the domestic law 
of states parties allow.  
The non-mandatory nature of the provisions on illicit enrichment in the various 
international anti-corruption legal frameworks emanates from the concern that creating an 
independent offence of illicit enrichment could undermine basic human rights conferred 
upon the accused.  In particular, the criminalisation of illicit enrichment has been considered 
as an infringement of the presumption of innocence. However, the non-obligatory nature of 
the provisions regarding illicit enrichment in international and regional anti-corruption 
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  See, for example, Article 20 of UNCAC and Article 8(1) of the AU Convention. 
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instruments creates a risk of failure to develop common standards for the full 
implementation of the conventions.165 
3.2.2.2     The Offence of Illicit Enrichment and Asset Recovery 
Asset recovery is a core constituent of international as well as regional anti-corruption 
instruments.166  It has been shown that the provisions of asset recovery embedded in the 
anti-corruption conventions, especially in UNCAC, encouraged ratification by many 
developing countries as a large amount of their wealth has been stolen by corruption.167 
The fact that UNCAC and the other regional anti-corruption instruments do not oblige states 
to criminalise illicit enrichment in their domestic law may pose a challenge in relation to 
recovering assets located in countries which have not criminalised illicit enrichment.168  
However, UNCAC provides for international co-operation for effective implementation and 
enforcement of its provisions.169  With respect to international co-operation regarding asset 
recovery, UNCAC firmly requires each state party ‘to afford one another the widest measure 
of co-operation and assistance’.170  Where dual criminality is required in international co-
operation, UNCAC further states that dual criminality ‘shall be deemed satisfied irrespective 
of whether the laws of the requested state party place the offence within the same category 
of offence or denominate the offence by the same terminology as the requesting state 
party’.171  Accordingly, the states parties that have not criminalised illicit enrichment under 
their domestic law may not refuse to co-operate in returning corruptly acquired assets to 
the countries of origin.  In this respect, UNCAC has closed the legal loopholes that could 
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have been created by the dual criminality requirement to recover proceeds of the offence of 
illicit enrichment across different jurisdictions. In addition, the AU Convention encourages 
states parties that have not criminalised illicit enrichment to provide assistance and co-
operation to the requesting states insofar as their law permits.172   
The different approaches that exist in different jurisdictions in regard to the standard of 
proof in illicit enrichment are creating a challenge in the recovery of corruptly acquired 
assets that are located in other jurisdictions.173  In this respect, the UN Secretary-General 
report to the General Assembly stated that:  
‘Obstacles are created by the diversity of approaches taken by different legal 
systems, in particular between common and civil law, with respect to matters such 
as jurisdiction, evidential requirements, the relationship between criminal 
prosecution and recovering proceeds and whether civil proceedings could be used. 
Countries seeking the return of assets often face severe challenges. High evidential 
and procedural standards required by the laws of developed countries where 
substantial proceeds of corruption are more likely to be concealed often pose a 
challenge.  Obtaining domestic freezing and confiscation orders that can form the 
basis for the transnational request and enforcement of such request, in particular 
depends upon high evidential and procedural standard requirements of the 
requested states’.174 
 
Further, asset recovery becomes more difficult where the proceeds of two or more crimes 
are intermingled.  In addition, it may involve two or more states claiming the recovery of the 
assets, making the process even more complicated.175  It has been established also that 
asset recovery is a costly, complicated and time-consuming process.176  A successful asset 
recovery exercise requires expertise, resources and commitment for tracing, freezing and 
confiscating.177 
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In Ethiopia, there has been as yet no case of asset recovery from a foreign jurisdiction on 
the basis of an illicit enrichment prosecution.178  However, in the embezzlement case of the 
former Deputy Prime Minister and others, the Federal Supreme Court of Ethiopia convicted 
the accused for a criminal transaction involving 1 000 tons of coffee that belonged to the 
government.179  The court, in addition to imposing 18 years’ imprisonment, ordered the 
defendants to return the proceeds of their corrupt activity. Following this judgement, the 
federal government filed a civil action against the defendants to collect expenses related to 
the transportation of and custom tax and excise tax on the coffee, plus interest associated 
with it.180  The Federal High Court decided the case in favour of the state by ordering the 
respondents to pay ETB 52 million, which is equivalent to USD 5.2 million, and the Federal 
Supreme Court Cassation Bench confirmed the judgement.181 
The process of recovering the proceeds of the crime started in June 2000, but the 
government could not recover the whole amount. This was partly because the proceeds 
were transferred to foreign banks such as Swiss Bank in Switzerland and Banque Indo-Suez 
Mer Rough in Djibouti. To recover the assets in a foreign jurisdiction there was a need to 
have resources and professional expertise. Unfortunately, these were lacking.   
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3.3    Illicit Enrichment and Human Rights Principles  
In addition to its recognition by international and regional anti-corruption instruments, 
different countries have criminalised illicit enrichment in their domestic laws.182 
As mentioned earlier, the criminalisation of illicit enrichment is important because often it is 
challenging or impossible for the prosecutor to establish that a public official has accepted a 
bribe or an undue advantage or committed any other form of corruption. Therefore, the 
criminalisation of illicit enrichment is important in that the property or pecuniary possession 
that is disproportionate to the legitimate income of public officials can create a prima facie 
case that a public official has been corrupted.183 
However, it was argued during the drafting of UNCAC that the criminalisation of illicit 
enrichment would be in violation of the presumption of innocence. Further, some 
delegations to the discussions prior to the Convention expressed their concern as to the 
implementation of the provision on illicit enrichment, fearing that it would face 
constitutional challenges.  They believed that constitutional difficulties could arise as the 
provision would include a reversal of the burden of proof.184   
Hence, some delegates suggested that the criminalisation of illicit enrichment should be 
non-binding upon states parties and moved to the chapter dealing with prevention in order 
to allow states to adopt administrative measures that encompass the concept.185   
It was argued also that the criminalisation of illicit enrichment does not necessarily include a 
reversal of the burden of proof per se. Rather, the onus upon the prosecutor to prove his 
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case beyond a reasonable doubt is confined to the disproportionate assets of the 
accused.186  In such circumstances, it would be convenient for the court to convict the 
accused if the prosecutor can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the luxurious life which 
the accused is living is disproportionate to his legitimate income. As agreed in the 
discussions preceding the adoption of UNCAC, the inclusion of such provision is important 
for the effective prosecution of crimes of corruption.187 
3.3.1   The Presumption of Innocence  
Countries that have a strong constitutional tradition, such as the United States and some 
European countries, are still reluctant to establish the offence of illicit enrichment as an 
independent crime of corruption.188  These countries are concerned about the presumption 
of innocence enshrined in their constitutions. In addition, the right to be presumed innocent 
as a requirement of the due process of law has a firm grounding, especially in the common 
law legal systems.189 
The International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) provides that: ‘Every one 
charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proven 
guilty according to law’.190  The principle of the presumption of innocence encompasses, 
among other elements, the burden of proof being upon the prosecution, the accused being 
protected against self-incrimination and the accused having the right to remain silent.191 
According to some commentators, criminalising illicit enrichment contradicts these human 
rights principles recognised by the ICCPR and other international and regional human rights 
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instruments.192  Wilsher observes that the criminalisation of illicit enrichment would exempt 
the prosecutor from having to prove the charge against the accused beyond a reasonable 
doubt as the prosecutor is not required to produce direct evidence that can establish the 
commission of corruption by the accused.193  He argues further that in the prosecution of 
illicit enrichment, the prosecutor should prove beyond a reasonable doubt the fact that the 
public official has received bribes or has committed any other form of corruption.194  
But, this line of argumentation overlooks the fact that corruption is a clandestine offence 
and that certain corrupt acts are naturally difficult to detect and it is hardly possible to 
discover evidence of their commission.195   Hence, to prove the offence of illicit enrichment 
to the extent of establishing the fact that the accused has received a bribe or other undue 
advantage would undermine the anti-corruption campaign significantly.  
As accepted in the discussions leading to the adoption of UNCAC, the possession of wealth 
that is manifestly disproportionate to the legitimate income of the accused constitutes a 
prima facie ground that the public official is corrupt.196  Thus, the prosecutor is required to 
present evidence only as to the wealth and lifestyle that exceeded the legitimate earnings of 
the accused.  
3.3.2    The Burden of Proof in the Prosecution of Illicit Enrichment  
In any lawsuit, including civil litigation, the party who brings the action or claim bears the 
burden of proving that the claim has both legal and evidential substance. In criminal 
litigation, the prosecutor is the one who initiates the litigation and thus carries the burden 
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to prove every element of the crime. This is sometimes called ‘the legal onus or burden of 
proof’.197   
In the case of illicit enrichment, the prosecutor has the legal duty to produce evidence to 
prove the property in the possession of the public official is quite disproportionate to his or 
her lawful income. The fact in issue that needs to be proved by the prosecutor is the 
accumulation of wealth by a public official that he or she cannot explain legitimately. In 
other words, in an illicit enrichment prosecution, it is the accumulation of wealth that is 
manifestly high as compared to the public official’s lawful income that needs proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.198  This would give rise to the presumption that the accused has acquired 
the property through corruption or in some other illegal way.  It is important to note here 
that this is a rebuttable presumption that requires the accused to give a reasonable 
explanation as to the lawful sources of the assets.199  This burden of producing evidence is 
sometimes known as the ‘evidential burden’.200    
As mentioned, the presumption of innocence does not prohibit a presumption of fact or law 
against the accused insofar the accused is given the chance to rebut it.201   In other words, 
the legislation creating illicit enrichment as an offence of corruption places an evidential 
burden upon the accused to provide reasonable evidence for the significant increase in his 
or her assets.202  It has been recognised that placing an evidential burden on the accused to 
rebut the presumption of corruption does not infringe the presumption of innocence.203  It 
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is important to note that creating an evidential burden does not mean that there is 
presumption of guilt as the burden of proof remains upon the prosecution.204       
Therefore, it is possible to conclude that criminalising and prosecuting illicit enrichment 
does not shift the burden of proof to the accused and if there is a presumption of 
corruption, this presumption is a permissive presumption that can be rebutted upon 
contrary evidence being produced by the accused. The presumption of fact which an 
accused is required to rebut is not necessarily contrary to the accused’s fundamental right 
to be presumed innocent.205 
3.3.3   Alternative Approach: The Proportionality Test  
In some jurisdictions, creating illicit enrichment as an independent offence of corruption is 
regarded as contrary to the right to be presumed innocent.206   
However, if creating an evidential burden to rebut an allegation infringes the presumption 
of innocence at all, this right, like many other rights, is not absolute.207  In combating 
corruption, two competing interests must be considered. These are: the threats corruption 
is posing to the overall socio-economic and political developments of society or the public 
interest, on one hand, and the protection of the presumption of innocence, on the other 
hand.  
In these circumstances, the risks and damages posed by corruption against the public 
interest are very high. Here, ‘the test of proportionality’208 is applicable, requiring the 
accused to produce evidence as to the lawful sources of his wealth after the prosecutor has 
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established that the assets in the hands of the accused could not have come reasonably 
from his or her legitimate income.  In the proportionality test, the seriousness of the 
corruption would justify the deviation from the protection given to the presumption of 
innocence.   
Therefore, if restriction of and the encroachment on the presumption of innocence in cases 
of prosecution of illicit enrichment exist at all, an effective anti-corruption campaign to 
protect the broader public interest justifies it.  
3.4   Illicit Enrichment in Ethiopian Anti-Corruption Law  
This section will deal specifically with the criminalisation and prosecution of illicit 
enrichment under Ethiopian anti-corruption law. The legal provision pertaining to this 
offence is found in Article 419 of the Criminal Code of Ethiopia.  
The offence of illicit enrichment contained in Article 20 of UNCAC has been incorporated 
into Article 419 of the Criminal Code of Ethiopia. The provision that governs the offence of 
illicit enrichment in the Criminal Code is termed ‘Possession of Unexplained Property’.209  It 
reads as follows:  
‘(1) any public servant, being or having been in a public office, who:  
a) maintains a standard of living above that which is commensurate with the official 
income from his present or past employment or other means; or  
b) is in control of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to the official 
income from his present or past employment or other means, shall, unless he gives a 
satisfactory explanation to the Court as to how he was able to maintain such a 
standard of living or how such pecuniary resources or property came under his 
control, be punished, without prejudice to the confiscation of the property or the 
restitution to the third party, with simple imprisonment or fine, or in serious cases, 
with rigorous imprisonment not exceeding five years and fine. 
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(2) Where the Court, during proceedings under sub-article (1)(b), is satisfied that 
there is reason to believe that any person, owing to his closeness to the accused or 
other circumstances, was holding pecuniary resource or property in trust for or 
otherwise on behalf of the accused, such resources, or property shall, in the absence 
of evidence to the contrary, be presumed to have been under the control of the 
accused.’210 
The article is applicable to public officials. The article employs the wording adopted in 
UNCAC, but also goes beyond it. In this respect, the offence of illicit enrichment in the 
Criminal Code encompasses any property or pecuniary resource that is manifestly 
disproportionate to the legitimate income either in the hands of a public official or any 
other person on behalf of the public official.211  Here, the offence of illicit enrichment in the 
Criminal Code corresponds with the AU Convention.212  The AU Convention defines the 
crime of illicit enrichment as ‘the significant increase of assets of a public official or any 
other person that he or she cannot reasonably explain in relation to his or her legitimate 
income’.213 
As mentioned, Article 419 of the Criminal Code explicitly extends to property that is 
possessed by another person on behalf of the public official.  A further distinct feature of 
the offence of illicit enrichment in the Criminal Code is that the unexplained property in the 
hands of a public official or a third party related to him must pertain to his or her present or 
past employment.214  The time element in article 419 of the Criminal Code is similar to the 
provision on illicit enrichment contained in the Inter-American Convention against 
Corruption.215 
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3.4.1   Easing the Burden of Proof and the Presumption of Innocence in Ethiopian Law 
The presumption of innocence is a fundamental principle of human rights and criminal 
justice in Ethiopia, as in other legal systems. The presumption of innocence imposes on the 
prosecutor the burden to prove the charge against the accused beyond a reasonable 
doubt.216  
The right to be presumed innocent is provided for under Article 20(3) of the Ethiopian 
Constitution, which states that: ‘During proceedings accused persons have the right to be 
presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law and not to be compelled to testify 
against themselves’.217   This article of the Constitution does not provide for how and when 
the presumption of innocence could be subject to restriction. 
The objective of the Ethiopian criminal law, as stated in the Criminal Code,  ‘is to ensure 
order, peace and the security of the state, its people and inhabitants for the public good’.218  
Further, the Criminal Code emanates from the Constitution and serves to pursue the goals 
sought to be achieved by the Constitution.219   
The burden of proof required for the prosecution of illicit enrichment in Ethiopian anti-
corruption law is that of producing evidence to demonstrate that the accused is in 
possession of property or maintains a standard of living that is manifestly disproportionate 
to his lawful income.220   The prosecutor still retains the legal burden to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt the significant increase in the wealth and the standard of living above that 
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which is commensurate with the lawful income of the accused.221   This is evident from the 
cases of Elizabeth Welde Gebriel et al and Mekonnen Workeneh Welde Semayat which will 
be discussed below.   
However, the provision in the Criminal Code dealing with the offence of illicit enrichment 
creates an evidential burden for the accused. It requires the accused to give a reasonable 
‘explanation to the court as to how he was able to maintain such a standard of living or how 
such pecuniary resource or property came under his control’.222       
In this respect, the Criminal Code eases the burden of proof for the prosecutor but requires 
him to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the disproportionate assets and the standard of 
living of the public official.  Further, the law requires the accused to produce evidence to 
prove the legitimate sources of the assets in question. The evidential burden imposed upon 
the accused in illicit enrichment cases does not necessarily violate the presumption of 
innocence under Article 20(3) of the Constitution, since the accused is given the opportunity 
to produce the evidence that can refute the allegation brought against him.223  
Therefore, the offence of illicit enrichment in the Ethiopian Criminal Code does not involve a 
shift of the burden of proof to the accused per se, and thus does not violate the 
constitutional right to be presumed innocent.  
3.4.2   Prosecuting Illicit Enrichment in Ethiopian Anti-Corruption Law   
In Ethiopian criminal litigation, the burden of proof primarily rests upon the prosecutor.224 
In an illicit enrichment case, the prosecutor retains the duty to prove beyond reasonable 
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doubt the fact that the accumulation of wealth in the hands of the public official exceeds his 
or her lawful income. Once the court is satisfied with this assertion, then an evidential 
burden rests upon the accused to give an explanation as to how he was able to maintain 
such a standard of living or how such pecuniary resource or property came under his 
control.  It is important to emphasise that this approach is crucial for protecting innocent 
defendants from being convicted where reasonable doubt exists as to their misuse of 
entrusted power for private gain.225 
In the case of Prosecutor v Elizabeth Welde Gebriel et al,226  the Federal High Court found 
Mulugeta Yayeh Zewdei guilty of the offence of possession of unexplained property. The 
accused was an employee of a metal factory, a public enterprise, with a monthly salary of    
3 778 ETB. The charge against him shows that the accused owned four houses and two plots 
of land in Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia.  He also had 158 964.8 ETB in his personal 
banking account. 
The prosecutor produced witness testimony and documentary evidence and proved that the 
accused owned assets disproportionate to his present and past employment and other 
legitimate income. The accused defended the charge against him by stating that he had 
received 60 000 ETB from his family to build a house and bought the land from the earnings 
of the house rent. However, his reasons were not convincing, as the expenses to build a 
house far exceeds 60 000 ETB and he could not build four houses with this amount only.  In 
addition, the accused failed to give a satisfactory explanation as to the amount of money 
found in accounts at three different banks.  
                                                          
225
  Wilsher (2006: 28); See also Tadros (2007: 197). 
226
  Prosecutor v Elizabeth Welde Gebriel et al (The Federal High Court, File Number 62293), judgement given    
       on 8 July 2011, page 24.  
 
 
 
 
49 
 
Accordingly, the Federal High Court after found him guilty of possession of unexplained 
property within the meaning of Article 419(1)(a) and (b) of the Criminal Code and sentenced 
him to three years’ imprisonment and a 7000 ETB fine. 
In the case of Prosecutor v Mekonnen Workeneh Welde Semayat,227 the Federal High Court 
acquitted the accused on the ground that he had given a credible explanation as to the 
source of his wealth. The charge against the accused stated that, while working in Ethiopian 
Revenue and Customs Authority, he had accumulated 1 136 541.47 ETB in banks and thus 
was found in possession of unexplained property.  
At the trial, the prosecutor presented to the court evidence concerning the present and past 
employment and earnings of the accused. He was earning 1000 ETB to 10 000 ETB from July 
2003 to September 2010. The prosecutor adduced evidence from the banks where the 
accused kept the money.  
The court, after hearing evidence brought against the accused, ordered him to produce 
evidence in his defence.  In so doing, the accused demonstrated that he inherited four 
hectares of land from his father and he was operating an agri-business on it with his two 
brothers. He also produced evidence that, in addition to the four hectares of land, he leased 
two hectares and he had been working on six hectares of land. Further, the accused 
presented evidence to show that the proceeds from the sale of the farming products, 
money he received from his sister living abroad, and the proceeds from the sale of a house 
in one of the regional state towns, supported by documentary evidence, were the sources 
of his income.  
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The court, after evaluating the evidence presented by both the prosecutor and the accused, 
acquitted him pursuant to Article 149(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ethiopia. The 
court, in its acquittal judgement, reasoned that though the income from the employment 
cannot be the source of more than one million Birr in the banking account, the accused had 
additional means of income which could be the source of such money.  The judgement 
further stated that the accused had explained sufficiently the sources of his wealth and thus 
it cannot be said that he had committed the crime of possession of unexplained property 
within the meaning of Article 419 of the Criminal Code. 
This particular case, however, shows that in prosecuting illicit enrichment, in addition to 
proving that the standard of living and the wealth are manifestly disproportionate to 
legitimate income, the prosecutor, during an investigation, must also make enquiries as to 
whether the accused has another means of income. If this is not done, at the trial stage the 
accused could disprove the allegation against him easily. The failure on the part of the 
prosecution will have a negative effect also upon the scarce resources of government, 
especially for a developing country like Ethiopia.  
Such occurrences are an indication of the need to build the capacity of prosecutors in 
investigating and prosecuting corruption cases. Of course, the legal and material 
complexities of organised crime, including corruption, demand specialised prosecution 
teams.228  This practice would create opportunities to enhance the overall capacity of the 
prosecution service to deal with complex cases in corruption and other organised crime 
matters.229 
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  Dandurand (2007: 233-234). 
229
  Dandurand (2007: 233-234). 
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3.5   Summary of Chapter Three  
This chapter has dealt with the criminalisation and prosecution of illicit enrichment. The 
clandestine nature of corruption creates difficulties in finding evidence to take corrupt 
public officials to court and to end impunity. Prosecuting public officials for disproportionate 
increase of assets after careful investigation will assist in overcoming evidential hurdles in 
investigating and prosecuting the crimes of corruption.  
Further, it is important to note that criminalising illicit enrichment assists in implementing 
and enforcing UNCAC and other regional anti-corruption instruments fully and effectively. In 
addition, the prosecution of the offence of illicit enrichment has been recognised as an 
effective anti-corruption tool in many developing countries. The complex and sophisticated 
nature of corruption crimes makes the investigation expensive in terms resources and 
expertise. 
However, because of certain human rights concerns, such as the presumption of innocence 
and other related rights, many countries, especially developed countries, are still reluctant 
to criminalise illicit enrichment.  
The case analysis that has been done in regard to the Ethiopian law of unexplained property 
demonstrates the advantages associated with criminalising illicit enrichment. Further, the 
analysis that has been made with regard to the embezzlement case of Tamerat Layne et al 
shows the challenges related to asset recovery in corruption cases in general.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
4.1    Conclusion 
Corruption is an age-old phenomenon in Ethiopian Society.  Gift-giving to public officials in 
order to get matters done long has been a tradition. In the past, bribery and nepotism were 
not regarded as corruption.  Such traditional gift-giving practices were transformed 
gradually into an open exercise during the Imperial regimes. Corrupt practices, such as 
embezzlement of public funds and abuse of power for personal gain, escalated during the 
Derg military regime and have continued after its fall.  It was also difficult to carry out 
routine business without involving some form of gift-giving.  This situation gave rise to the 
attitude among public officials and civil servants that corruption was a normal and unofficial 
source of income.230   Hence, it is possible to say that corruption in Ethiopia is rooted in the 
country’s social cultural, political and bureaucratic traditions.231     
Studies by international and regional organisations show that corruption is becoming a 
serious problem in Ethiopia.232  The first comprehensive survey carried out in 2001 by the 
Institute of Educational Research of Addis Ababa University, in collaboration with the 
FEACC, revealed that corruption is one of the main challenges hampering the development 
of the country.233  According to the latest Ethiopian corruption perception survey conducted 
in 2012, corruption is the country’s seventh most serious socio-economic problem.234      
                                                          
230
  FEACC (2012: 21). 
231
  Shimelis (2005: 62-63).  
232
  Transparency International (2010: 178).  See also Global Financial Integrity Report (2011).  
233
  FEACC (2012: 22). 
234
  FEACC (2012: 106-107). 
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Motivated by the widespread prevalence of corruption in the country, the current 
government took the initiative by establishing the FEACC, a body dedicated to fighting 
corruption. The Ethiopian government, in its efforts to promote anti-corruption, ratified 
UNCAC, UNCTOC and the AU Convention.   
Further, the Penal Code of 1957 was amended in May 2005 by the Criminal Code, resulting 
in the criminalisation of illicit enrichment, money laundering and other corruption and 
corruption-related conducts.  This research paper, in line with the international and regional 
anti-corruption instruments and domestic legislation, examined the usefulness of 
criminalising illicit enrichment in combating corruption. The clandestine nature of 
corruption creates difficulties in finding evidence to prosecute corrupt public officials and 
end impunity. The complex and sophisticated nature of corruption makes the investigation 
expensive in terms resources and expertise. Prosecuting public officials for disproportionate 
increase of assets after careful investigation will assist in the fight against corruption.  
Further, it is important to note that criminalising illicit enrichment assists in implementing 
and enforcing UNCAC and other regional anti-corruption instruments fully and effectively. In 
addition, the prosecution of the offence of illicit enrichment has been recognised as an 
effective anti-corruption tool in many developing countries.  
The case analysis that has been done in regard to the Ethiopian law of unexplained property 
demonstrates the advantages associated with criminalising illicit enrichment. In addition, 
the analysis that has been made of the embezzlement case of Tamerat Layne et al shows 
the challenges, such as the lack of resources and expertise related to asset recovery, 
inherent in corruption cases in general.  
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However, because of certain human rights concerns, such as the presumption of innocence 
and the right against self-incrimination invoked against it, many countries, especially 
developed countries, remain reluctant to criminalise illicit enrichment.   
Comparative analyses of the Hong Kong and Singapore legislative frameworks reveal the 
weakness and lacunae that exist in Ethiopian anti-corruption laws. Despite their 
categorisation as ‘strong’235 and comprehensive, the analysis made in relation to the 
international anti-corruption instruments reveals that the anti-corruption laws of Ethiopia 
do not regulate corruption in the private sector.  Civil asset forfeiture in the absence of a 
criminal conviction is another area where the anti-corruption legal framework falls short. 
Further, the analysis of the law shows that to enforce multilateral international or regional 
agreements on matters of international co-operation, the domestic law, especially the 
Criminal Code, is weak and does not cover all aspects of international co-operation.  
4.2    Recommendations 
A well-crafted and comprehensive law cannot by itself curb corruption. Of course, the 
failure to control corruption in most countries, including Ethiopia, is attributed partly to the 
fact that the laws are not enforced properly. It is important to have in place an appropriate 
law enforcement mechanism to curb corruption. Accordingly, the following 
recommendations are proposed for effective implementation of anti-corruption legislation.  
4.2.1    Anti-Corruption Law Enforcement   
Ethiopia has been scoring between 3.5 and 2.7 in Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index from 2001 to 2011. The data analysis for such outcome, among other 
factors, takes into consideration the enforcement of anti-corruption laws in the country. 
                                                          
235
  Global Integrity Report: Ethiopia (2008). See also Mezmur & Koen (2011: 234). 
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Therefore, proper implementation of the law is urgent in order to create a corruption-free 
Ethiopia or at least ensure that corruption is reduced to minimum level. In this regard, the 
experience of Hong Kong and Singapore shows that the implementation of anti-corruption 
laws has contributed greatly to their success in eradicating corruption. 
Though there are certain lacunae in the anti-corruption legal framework, as identified in this 
research paper, Ethiopia has put in place the most important legal and institutional 
mechanism to combat corruption. The challenge that remains is the effective 
implementation of the anti-corruption legislation. Laws that have criminalised illicit 
enrichment and other forms of corruption need to be enforced against corrupt public 
officials effectively. Proper implementation of the anti-corruption legislation ensures the 
accountability of those who commit the crime of corruption. If the criminal law is enforced 
properly, criminals never will walk free and enjoy impunity.  Proper enforcement deters 
criminals from committing other crimes and sends a message to others who would like to 
commit corruption.  
4.2.2    Amendments to the Anti-Corruption Laws 
The enactment of new laws and amendment of existing ones are a first step towards 
countering corruption.  According to the second national corruption perception survey 
conducted in 2012, weak or non-existent laws were indicated to be one of the reasons for 
widespread corruption in the public sector.236  The analysis that has been made in Chapter 
Two of this paper also reveals that Ethiopia needs to improve and amend its anti-corruption 
laws in certain respects. Accordingly, specific areas that need amendment or legislative 
intervention will be identified in this section. 
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An amendment to the provision dealing with the offence of possession of unexplained 
property: The provision of the Criminal Code which deals with the offence of possession of 
unexplained property, without prejudice to the confiscation of the property, prescribes a 
maximum of five years’ imprisonment and a fine. While the criminalisation of the possession 
of unexplained property is welcome as one of the most useful anti-corruption tools, the 
punishment attached to it is minimal in terms of its deterring effect. In this respect, the case 
of Mulugeta Yayeh Zewdei237 shows that the accused had owned 158 964.8 ETB in his 
personal banking account in three different banks. He also owned four houses and two plots 
of land.  The Federal High Court, in addition to ordering the confiscation of the property, 
sentenced him to three years’   imprisonment. In the case of Hankara Harka Hamoya,238  the 
Federal Supreme Court confirmed four years’ imprisonment given by the subordinate 
regional courts against the defendant. These cases show that the assets in the hands of the 
accused are counted in millions. Obviously, the law should have imposed severe penalty in 
terms of imprisonment that can convey a meaningful message to potential offenders.  
Therefore, the legislator should bear in mind the threats posed by corruption to the all-
round development of the country and reconsider the effectiveness of illicit enrichment for 
the country’s anti-corruption effort. In this respect, the legislator should be more aware of 
the clandestine and the sophisticated nature of the commission of corruption crimes and 
amend the Criminal Code to prescribe a more effective punishment for the crime of 
possession of unexplained property.             
                                                          
237
  He was an accused in Prosecutor v Elizabeth Welde Gebriel et al (The Federal High Court, File Number  
       62293). 
238
  Prosecutor v Hankara Harka Hamoya (The Federal Supreme Court, File Number 58514). 
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An amendment to the existing FEACC Establishment Proclamation No 433/2005 to include 
corruption in the private sector:  The Ethiopian anti-corruption law needs to regulate 
corruption in the private sector. The fast economic growth that we are witnessing in the 
country today and the economic liberalisation that has been taking place are expanding the 
engagement of private actors in key economic sectors. The economic growth and free flow 
of money enhance the interaction within the private sector and between the private sector 
and public institutions and this situation creates opportunities for corruption.  
Therefore, the government should take legislative measures to prevent corruption in the 
private sector. In this regard, the legislator should incorporate corruption in the private 
sector in the anti-corruption legal framework and ensure the compatibility of the law with 
international anti-corruption standards.  Further, the experiences of Hong Kong and 
Singapore show that in these countries corruption in the private sector is regulated on a par 
with corruption in the public sector. 
Amendments to international co-operation provisions: In matters of international co-
operation, Ethiopia mainly relies on the international and regional anti-corruption 
conventions which it has ratified. The domestic law, particularly the Criminal Code, only 
covers matters of extradition and thus further adjustments are required in the domestic law 
with regard to other aspects of international co-operation. 
Adoption of a civil forfeiture law: In the fight against corruption, the issue of civil asset 
forfeiture is not given attention in the Ethiopian anti-corruption legal framework. In the 
absence of a criminal conviction, it is not clear whether it is possible to forfeit corruptly 
acquired assets. Also, it is not certain whether it is possible to bring a civil suit against the 
property if the criminal is unable to stand trial for one reason or another. In the case of an 
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acquittal, though it may be possible to bring a civil action against the property since the 
standard of proof is proof on a balance of probability, it would be difficult in practice to 
obtain a court order for forfeiture.  In the absence of clear authorisation in the anti-
corruption legislation, the Ethiopian trend shows that the prosecution service is reluctant to 
bring a civil action against corruptly acquired property to secure an asset forfeiture order. 
Therefore, the adoption of a civil asset forfeiture law into the Ethiopian anti-corruption legal 
framework would be a major step forward in implementing the principles of UNCAC in the 
fight against corruption. Further, the experience of Singapore shows that civil asset 
forfeiture plays an important role in combating corruption.   
4.2.3    Capacity Building in the Investigation and Prosecution of Corruption Cases 
The fight against corruption using the legal framework requires trained and skilled human 
resources and capable institutions to enforce the anti-corruption legislation.239  Capacity 
building for law enforcement staff plays an important role in implementing anti-corruption 
laws.  As long as the law enforcement staff continues to be under-capacitated, it will be 
difficult to prosecute successfully those suspected of engaging in corruption. In this respect, 
constant effort has to be made to train professionals in law enforcement agencies, including 
judges.  
Technological advancement complicates the commission of corruption crimes and, hence, 
continuous training programmes aimed at raising the investigative and prosecution capacity 
of the law enforcement staff should be provided. Special training programmes have to be 
put in place by the FEACC and the Federal Supreme Court in collaboration with NGOs and 
                                                          
239
 FEACC & UNDP (2010: 6). 
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international organisations such as the UNODC in the areas of investigation and prosecution 
of illicit enrichment and asset recovery.       
The case analysis made in Chapter Three clearly urges the need to enhance the capacity of 
investigators and prosecutors in anti-corruption cases. The prosecution of Mekonnen 
Workneh Welde Semayat for the offence of illicit enrichment and the prosecution of the 
case of Tamerat Layne to recover corruptly acquired asset demonstrate the need to 
strengthen the skills of our investigative officers and prosecutors in corruption cases.  
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